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The Relevance of the Marshallian Concept of Normality 
in Interior and in Inertial Dynamics  
as Revisited by G. SHACKLE and J. KORNAI 
 
 
 
Abstract : This study endeavours to explicate the relevance of the Marshallian concept of  
normal in the evolution of supply curves and the price mechanism in time. This concept is based 
on the contradictory or at least ambiguous combination of an ex ante perspective of expectation 
formation and an ex post inertial dynamics. We first explore the ex ante side of the contradiction 
by drawing upon the writings of G. Shackle. Subsequently, we examine J. Kornai’s conception 
of the normal state as system-specific. We identify the relationship between normality and the 
co-ordination mechanism in Kornai’s ex post approach which may be regarded as an alternative 
to Shackle’s solution. Finally, the pertinence of the Marshallian concept of normal will be 
demonstrated as will its divergent developments by Shackle and Kornai. This leads us to the 
conclusion that a further development of the concept is required in order to reconcile both ex 
ante and ex post approaches which might be based on recent evolutionary analysis.         
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Introduction 
 
"Passent les jours et passent les semaines 
Ni temps passé 
Ni les amours reviennent 
Sous le pont Mirabeau coule la Seine 
Vienne la nuit sonne l'heure 
Les jours s'en vont je demeure"  
Apollinaire, "Le Pont Mirabeau", Alcools, 1920 
 
 It is an ancient view that truth is attained by the poet. A poem is something made, originated. 
History, in the view of its first practitioners, was a personal art. Subjugated to the order of time and the 
irreversibility of sentiments which the flow of the river (the Seine) symbolises, Apollinaire grasps the 
source of his sorrows and joys in love's fundamental dilemma : the clash between time, flowing like the 
Seine, and the permanence of one's character and attitudes which is expressed by the metaphor of the 
Mirabeau bridge. Our reminiscences, as well as our hopes search a way out of this dilemma : the former 
as a passive means consoles our spirit by recalling the familiar order of life passed, while the latter 
actively endeavours to shape, or invent a new stability amidst the ongoing changes in the future through 
anticipation and  expectation. 
 Apollinaire is an artist and not a scientist. He writes about sentiments rather than the mind. But 
the question he raises with regard to the human spirit is the same as the one science poses : Can the basic 
stuff and nature of the world be such as to allow us to explain its perpetually evolving life-forms and the 
endless flux of human history and affairs? "The element of time is the centre of the chief difficulty of 
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almost every economic problem" ( Marshall, [1890] 1961, p. vii). This is how Marshall formulated the 
same question. He was convinced that the economist must study change. Yet he also believed that the 
economist must be a seeker of principles and not a mere chronicler of the superficial. How was this 
contradiction to be resolved? Marshall held that if change was continuous in the sense of proceeding by 
such small steps and in such varying respects as to be perceptible only over long intervals, then the 
tendencies which generated change at one date would still be recognisably at work, even if they had 
themselves meanwhile been modified, at later dates. This explains Marshall's insistence on the distinct 
and differing effects produced by given forces working undisturbed for short or long periods; and his 
struggle to clarify his conception of the normal. A normal state would have been achieved if, contrary to 
the facts of an ever-changing environment and the endless stream of "accidents", such non-disturbance 
had in fact been realised. This Marshallian concept of the "normal" enables a static analysis to be applied 
to an ever-changing reality. 
 This study endeavours to explicate the relevance of the Marshallian concept of normal in the 
evolution of supply curves and the price mechanism in time. This concept is based on the contradictory or 
at least ambiguous combination of an ex ante perspective of expectation formation and an ex post inertial 
dynamics (section 1). In the second section, we explore the ex ante side of the contradiction by drawing 
upon the writings of Shackle. The third section is devoted to Kornai's conception of the normal state as 
system-specific. We will identify the relationship between normality and the co-ordination mechanism in 
Kornai’s ex post approach which may be regarded as an alternative to Shackle's solution. Finally, the 
pertinence of the Marshallian concept of normal will be demonstrated as will its divergent developments 
by Shackle and Kornai. This leads us to the conclusion that a further development of the concept is 
required in order to reconcile both ex ante and ex post approaches which might be based on recent 
evolutionary analysis. 
I. Marshall's Concept of Normal and his Time-Spectrum 
 In his preface to the first edition of the Principles, Marshall ([1890] 1961) set  himself the task of 
elucidating the permanent and the essential behind the transitory appearance of things. The society which 
lay beneath his eyes, Victorian England, was growing in population, technical knowledge, technical  
accomplishment, literacy and the breadth of suffrage. Its industrial methods and commercial 
arrangements were fast changing. Yet this rapid evolution, Marshall seems to assume, was explicable by 
some permanent logic of human existence. It was to this constant and permanent something that he tried 
to reach down. And he found in the concept of the "normal" that which enables static analysis to be 
applied to an ever-changing reality. This concept is, perhaps, the most difficult in all of Marshall's book : 
"... in the present book normal action is taken to be that which may be expected, under certain conditions, 
from the members of an  industrial group; and no attempt is made to exclude the influence of any 
motives, the action of which is regular, merely because they are altruistic. If the book has any special 
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character of its own,  that may perhaps be said to lie in the prominence which it gives to this and other 
applications of the Principle of Continuity." (Marshall, [1890] 1961, p. vi). Natura non facit saltum. It is 
this phrase in the Principles which stands out as an appeal to the  gradualness of change and as a 
measure of ascribing to it permanent and discoverable causes. Within this frame (the continuous 
character of evolutionary change), Marshall speaks of the "normal".  
 The normal, with regard to price, daily or yearly quantities supplied, quantities of resources 
employed in a given industry and so on, is the result of two different processes (technological and market) 
each with its own time-scale. There must be time enough for the technological process of adaptation to 
occur and there must be the prospect of the altered circumstances of demand or supply continuing long 
enough to make the result worthwhile. The fulfillment of both these pre-conditions spawns the long 
period, allowing the full adaptation of both processes which can be discerned by the businessman, or 
perhaps the analyst himself. The prospect of the altered circumstances continuing belongs to the interior 
perspectiveii. This prospect is routinely assumed in standard theory, even for short period analysis. 
Marshall does not routinely assume it; indeed the prospect of a reversal encourages firms to restrain their 
price rises when demand expands and to keep price above marginal cost when it contracts; the context, of 
course, is a firm which is concerned to expand its trading connections, which is the context which most of 
Marshall’s discussions of normality refers to. 
 Moreover the normal is what would come about given the ceteris paribus conditions which, in 
fact, cannot be preserved. If time for adaptation is prescribed by the analyst is shorter than might be 
eventually needed, or if the duration of the new circumstances is assumed to be limited, then there will be 
a "normal" adaptation in respect of these restricted opportunities. The normal is relative to the 
opportunities. Insisting on the continuity of change, Marshall shows how it can be split into stages, each 
having its own unity and rationale. The changes in prices which we may regard as normal if we are 
thinking of the changes from hour to hour on a Produce Exchange do no more than indicate the current 
variations with regard to the year's history. And normal prices with reference to the year's history are but 
current prices relative to the history of the century. For time is " absolutely continuous : Nature knows no 
absolute partition of time into long periods  and short; but the two shade into one another by 
imperceptible graduation, and what is a short period for one problem, is a long period for another" 
(Marshall, [1890] 1961, p. vii). Despite the absence of any partition between "normal" and "current" 
price in real time, there is a logical difference between this pair of concepts in a given period of time. 
I.1. The Normal Value, the Market Value, and the Average Value 
 As there is no sharp division between that which is normal and that which is  provisionally 
disregarded as abnormal, there is also no sharp division between normal values and current, market or 
occasional values. The latter "are those values in which the accident of the moment exert a 
preponderating influence; while normal values are those which would be ultimately attained, if the 
 5
economic conditions under view had time to work out undisturbed their full effect. But there is no 
impassable gulf between these two; they shade into one another by continuous gradation" (Marshall, 
[1890] 1961, p. vii). Interpreted in this way, the concept of "normal" goes back to Adam Smith's idea of  
"natural" value. In fact, for Marshall, the concept of normal value is the real meaning of that much 
quoted and much "misunderstood" doctrine of Adam Smith and other economists that the normal or 
"natural" value of a commodity is that which economic forces tend to bring about in the long run. It is the 
average value which economic forces would bring about if the general conditions of life were stationary 
for a run of time long enough to enable them all to work out their full effect. But we cannot foresee the 
future perfectly. The unexpected may happen and existing tendencies may be disturbed before they have 
had time to accomplish what appears now to be realised. The fact that the general conditions of life are 
not stationary is the source of many of the difficulties that are met with in applying economic doctrines to 
practical problems (Marshall, [1890] 1961, pp. 347-348). This explains why for Marshall, the normal 
price is generally not equivalent to average price.  
 In a rigidly stationary state in which supply could be perfectly adjusted to demand in every 
particular the normal costs of production, the marginal costs, and the average costs (inclusive of rent) 
would be the same, for long periods and for short. However in a non-stationary world, the distinction 
between average price and normal price is essential : "An average may be taken of the prices of any set of 
sales extending over a day or a week or any other time : or it may be the average of sales at any time in 
many markets;  or it may be the average of many such averages. But the conditions which are normal for 
any one set of sales are not likely to be exactly those which are normal for others : and therefore it is only 
by accident that an average price will be a normal price; that is, the price which any one set of conditions 
tends to produce. In a stationary state alone, as we have just seen, the term normal always means the 
same thing : there, but only there, 'average price'  and 'normal price' are convertible terms" (Marshall, 
[1890] 1961, p.372).  Since “normal” is not equivalent to “average”, we can conclude that the 
consequences of normal behaviour must be the subject of thought-experiments; econometrics is of 
dubious relevance to the appraisal of such theories. 
 It is noteworthy that in Marshall’s work, the normal value itself is defined under the ceteris 
paribus clause, namely the permanence of some tendency applying to a particular set of sales. It is 
therefore sufficient to suppose that firms grow and decline, but that the "representative" firm remains 
always of about the same size, and therefore, that the economies resulting from the resources of such a 
“representative” firm are constant (Marshall, [1890] 1961, p. 367). Since the aggregate value of 
production is constant, so too are those economies resulting from subsidiary industries located nearby. 
Putting it differently, the general economic conditions around us change rapidly; but they do not change 
rapidly enough to affect perceptibly the short period normal level about which prices fluctuate from day 
to day (Marshall, [1890] 1961, p. 369). 
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 Normal does not mean competitive, at least not in the modern sense of perfect competition. 
According to Marshall, market and normal prices alike are brought about by a "multitude of influences of 
which some rest on a moral basis and some on physical; of which some are competitive and some are not. 
It is to the persistence of the influences considered, and the time allowed for them to work out their 
effects that we refer when contrasting market and normal price, and again when contrasting the narrower 
and the broader use of the term normal price" (Marshall, [1890] 1961, p. 348). Meanwhile, although the 
normal price is determined by factors which are not solely competitive, for Marshall, the normal usually 
implies a good deal of competitioniii. In fact, the normal price is based on some kind of "expectation", 
conventions and the attitudes of producers and consumers. The "normal" has many dimensions, not only 
those related to competitive market forces but also those which lie outside the market and determine the 
structure of the market. Borrowing the military distinction between tactics and strategy, Marshall 
contends  that in economics ‘tactics’ refer to those outward forms and accidents of economic organisation 
which depend on temporary or local aptitudes, customs and relations of classes, on the influence of 
individuals, or on the changing factors and needs of production. Hence market value belongs to tactics. 
‘Strategy’, in contast, corresponds to the more "fundamental substance of economic organisation", which 
depends mainly on such wants and activities, such preferences and aversions as are "found in man 
everywhere".  Indeed, the human needs and preferences are not always the same in form, or even in 
substance; yet they have "a sufficient element of permanence and universality to enable them to be 
brought in some measure under general statements" (Marshall, [1890] 1961, Appendix C, p. 777). The 
concept of normal belongs to this strategy category. In this respect, normal price, contrary to market 
price, has a regulatory effect, as a sort of gravitational force around which fluctuates the accidental, 
phenomenal force of market price. This kind of “gravity force” should be clearly distinguished from neo-
Ricardian centres of gravitation in which expectation does not play a major role. For Marshall, the 
normal price is the price the expectation of which will just suffice to maintain the existing aggregate 
amount of production, albeit with some firms growing and increasing their output, and others shrinking 
and reducing theirs. The normal reveals the general feature and gives a sense to "aggregate" by defining 
the particular general conditions underlining an order not only in its competitive market aspects, but also 
in its non-competitive dimensions. 
I.2. Normal Supply and the Time-Spectrum 
 According to Marshall, we have to represent the normal demand price and supply price as 
functions both of the amount normally produced and of the time period relative to which that amount is 
normal. An important difference between the demand curve and the supply curve resides in the fact that 
the former rests on the fundamental psychological law of diminishing returns, while the latter may be 
subject to the law of increasing returns. However the law of increasing returns only applies in long run. 
As a general rule, the shorter the period which we are considering, the greater is the influence of demand 
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on value; and the longer the period, the more important will be the influence of cost of production on 
value (Marshall, [1890] 1961, Book V, p. 349). Thus in the long run, supply has the overriding role in 
determining the normal value. Being subject to increasing returns, the conditions of normal supply are 
less definite as compared with the normal demand (Marshall, Book V, p. 342).  
 The general meaning of the term normal supply price is always the same whether the period to 
which it refers is short or long; but there are great differences in detail. In every case reference is made to 
a certain given rate of aggregate production; that is, to the production of a certain aggregate amount daily 
or annually. In every case the normal price is that which meets the expectation of people with regard to 
the compensation which they claim in order to consider worthwhile to produce that aggregate amount. In 
every case the cost of production is marginal, viz. it is the cost of production of those goods which are on 
the margin of not being produced at all, and which would not be produced if the price to be had for them 
were expected to be lower (Marshall, p. 373). When the term normal is taken to relate to short periods of 
a few months or a year, supply means broadly what can be produced for the price in question with the 
existing stock of plant, personal and impersonal, in the given time. When the term normal refers to long 
periods of several years, supply means what can be produced by plant, which itself can be profitably 
produced and applied within the given time. Finally, there are very gradual or secular movements of 
normal price, caused by the gradual growth of knowledge, of population and of capital, and the changing 
conditions of demand and supply from one generation to another. In fact a theoretically perfect long 
period must give time enough to enable not only the factors of production of the commodity to be 
adjusted to the demand, but also the factors of production of those factors of production to be adjusted 
and so on. And this, when carried to its logical consequences, will be found to involve the supposition of 
a stationary state of industry, in which the requirements of a future age can be anticipated beforehand 
(Marshall, p. 379). This “theoretically perfect long period”, with its stringent requirement either for 
rational expectations or the limitation of contingencies, would prevent Marshall (or anyone else) from 
analysing change. In such a setting normal would be equivalent to average, and the outside view is all 
that is required. 
  According to Marshall, the long period during which the true normal price is formed can be 
explicated as the period in which "the normal action of economic forces has time to work itself out more 
fully; in which therefore temporary scarcity of skilled labour, or of any other of the agents of production, 
can be remedied; and in which those economies that normally result from an increase in the scale of 
production... have time to develop themselves. The expenses of a representative firm, managed with 
normal ability and having normal access to the internal and external economies of production on a large 
scale, may be taken as a standard for estimating normal expenses of production..." (Marshall, p. 497). In 
the light of this definition of true normal price under the law of increasing returns, Marshall can revert 
once again to the distinction between average values and normal values, since the distinction becomes 
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particularly clear in a non-stationary state marked by the internal and external economies of production. 
In other words, this very distinction reveals that the normal value belongs to economic dynamics.  
 Furthermore, it should be noted that Marshall invokes his typical or representative firm in order 
to define a “standard for estimating normal expenses of production”. What does a representative firm 
mean? This question is particularly important in our times since Marshall’s concept of the representative 
firm is frequently misinterpreted in a Pigovian spirit, and has been criticised on the basis of such 
interpretation. 
  As Loasby (1976), Moss (1984), Langlois (1994), and others have argued, what we 
think of as mainstream “Marshallian” theory today is in many ways more Pigovian than it is Marshallian. 
Rather than thinking in population terms as Marshall did, and constructing a “representative firm” that 
reflects the characteristics of the population of firms as a whole (rather than the characteristics of any 
particular firm), the neo-classical theory of the firm since Pigou begins with identical idealised firms and 
then builds up to the industry by simple addition. It is this later methodological standpoint, not any 
logical problem with Marshall’s own conception, that led to the famous controversy over increasing 
returns early in the century. As Richardson rightly remarks : “the  apparent necessity of finding some 
reason why long-run marginal costs should ultimately rise is created not by the phenomena themselves, 
but by the nature of the theoretical schema through which we have chosen to study them” (Richardson, 
[1960] 1990, p. 213). The “theory of the firm” in modern-day price theory builds on the Pigovian 
foundation. It begins with firms as production functions, each one identical, and each one transforming 
homogenous inputs into homogenous outputs according to given technical “blueprints” known to all. For 
Marshall, in contrast, the analysis of the representative firm was part and parcel of a general theory on 
industrial structure (Marshall, [1898] 1925, 1919). “As Marshall understood, the firm in price theory is a 
theoretical link in the explanation of changes in price and quantity (supplied, demanded, or traded) in 
response to changes in exogenous factors...It was never intended to explain industrial structure, let alone 
to serve as a guide to industrial policy” (Langlois, 1994, p. 3). He attempted to incorporate variety as a 
key element in his theoretical apparatus. For instance, the notion of industry equilibrium in Marshall’s 
work, which describes a population of disequilibrium firms with industry level supply-demand 
equilibrium, is a reflection of his endeavour to capture variety analytically. The concept of “the 
representative firm” is Marshall’s invention in order to bridge the firm level and the industry level. It 
must not to confused with Arthur Pigou’s interpretation of  “the representative firm” which excludes 
Marshall’s disequilibrium firm, and transforms it into the homogenous, uniform equilibrium firm. 
I. 3. Normality, Increasing Returns, and Economic Dynamics 
 In a stationary state the income earned by every factor of production is exactly the same as the 
income expected or anticipated by the producer for bringing that factor into production. In such a state, 
the earned or actual income would represent the normal measure of the efforts and sacrifices required to 
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call into existence. The aggregate costs of production might then be found either by multiplying these 
marginal expenses by the number of units of the commodity, or by adding together all the actual costs of 
production of its several parts, and adding in all the rents earned by differential returns to production. 
The aggregate costs of production being determined by either of these routes, the average costs could be 
deduced by dividing by the amount of commodity; and the result would be the normal price, whether for 
long periods or for short.  
 Hence in a stationary state where the expected or normal price of every factor of production is 
equal to its actual price, the normal price is equal to average cost. It follows that in the Walrasian 
equilibrium theory, the normal price can be regarded as equal to the average costs if it can be 
demonstrated that this theory is also based on the hypothesis of the complete realisation of expectations. 
As a matter of fact, one of the possible methods of approaching a general equilibrium advocated by 
Walras himself, namely the Walrasian tâtonnement procedure requires the hypothesis of full realisation 
of anticipation. This procedure can be described as follows. The commissaire-priseur (auctioneer) 
announces an arbitrary price and waits to receive the information from both buyers and sellers 
concerning the quantity of goods which they desire to buy  or to sell at such a hypothetical price. The 
buyers and sellers do not carry out any real transaction; they only communicate the information regarding 
their buying or selling intentions to the commissaire-priseur on a piece of paper. If the expected quantity 
to sell is equal to the expected quantity to buy, the commissaire-priseur will fix the arbitrary price as 
equilibrium price. Then the real or actual exchange can begin. However, if they are not equal, the 
commissaire-priseur will continue to announce new arbitrary prices until he finds the correct equilibrium 
prices. In this sense, the Walrasian equilibrium as a perfect equilibrium of demand and supply over all 
markets, can be achieved when the expected or anticipated prices (“normal” prices) are fully realised.  
 However, "in the world in which we live, the term 'average' expenses of production is somewhat 
misleading" (Marshall, [1890] 1961, Appendix H, p. 810). Because most of the factors of production, 
material and personal, by which a commodity is made, come into existence after a certain period of time. 
Their values are therefore not likely to be just what the producers expect them to be originally; but some 
of their values will be greater and others less, depending on the scale of returns. Thus present incomes 
earned by the factors of production will be governed by the general relations between the demand for, and 
the supply of their products; and their values will be arrived at by capitalising these incomes. Therefore 
the normal  expenses of production in a dynamic world cannot be equivalent to the average expenses due 
to the permanent deviation of the long period normal values from the originally expected values. This 
deviation depends, among other things, on the scale returns to production in the long term. For Marshall, 
"the problem of normal value belongs to economic dynamics. Partly because statics is really but a branch 
of dynamics and partly because all suggestions as to economic rest, of which the hypothesis of a 
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stationary state is the chief, are merely provisional, used only to illustrate particular steps in the 
argument, and to be thrown aside when that is done" (Marshall,  Book V, p. 366). 
 Of course in Marshall's epoch, the concept of "dynamics" was not yet scrutinised. Since the late 
thirties and during the forties and fifties, the concept of dynamics as opposed to statics has been the 
subject of hot debate (Baumol, 1951). While Marshall emphasized statics as a branch of dynamics, Hicks 
suggests that we call "... Economic Statics those parts of economic theory where we do not trouble about 
dating; Economic Dynamics those parts where every quantity must be dated" (Hicks, 1939, p. 115). For 
Hicks, statics only embraces the analysis of stationary situations, i.e. situations were nothing changes, 
and where no attention need be paid to the past or to the future because the facts and analysis relating to 
the present will apply equally well at any other time. In contrast, Harrod, in his Towards a Dynamic 
Economics, suggests another definition of dynamics which is more faithful to the Marshall's vision of the 
problem. For Harrod, dynamics should be confined to the analysis of continuing changes as against once-
and-for-all changes. The latter's approach, comparing the system in equilibrium before and after change, 
is termed comparative statics. While Harrod's definition of dynamics can shed some light on the nature of 
dynamics as nonstationary (Harrod, 1948), it does not make any distinction between an objective 
dynamic viewpoint and a subjective one, since Harrod's definition is not based on the criteria of 
expectations and uncertainty. These criteria are, however, essential in the appraisal of the normal as a 
dynamic phenomenon. 
II. Shackle’s Contribution to the Concept of Normal : ex ante Vision 
 George Shackle has devoted several articles to the clarification of the Marshallian time-spectrum 
(Shackle, 1965, 1972, 1989). In our view, his most important contribution consists in his insistence on 
the dual aspects of the concept normal, namely the ex ante perspective of the businessman (interior 
dynamics), and the ex post perspective of historian, mathematician or observer in general (exterior 
dynamics). 
II. 1. Two Views of Time, Two Types of Dynamics 
 For Shackle, there exist two utterly different views of time, the outside view and the inside view. 
What he means by the "outside view" is illustrated especially by the perspective adopted by the 
mathematician and historian in their academic capacity. The mathematician treats time as a space, or as 
one dimension in space, in which all points have an equal status or importance or validity together, within 
one and the same vision of the world. All points have  simultaneous validity, each of them means the 
same to him when he thinks about them all in one thought. At which of these instants does the 
mathematician place himself, at which does he take his stand? At none of them; he is an outside observer, 
not part of the system he is describing, and for him all the instants are, in the instantaneous logic of his 
own thought, equally and simultaneously valid and meaningful. Like the mathematician, the historian also 
considers the long process of history as a single panorama, as a unity, every part of it as real as every 
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other part. He is an outside observer, not himself part of what he describes. "With this outside, detached, 
sophisticated view of time, I want to contrast the inside view which each of us has in the very act of 
living, the time in which we sense-perceive, feel, think, imagine, and decide" (Shackle, 1989, p. 15). This 
inside view of time is what Shackle calls the "solitary present" or the "moment-in-being". The 
experienced moment, the moment-in-being, is for the individual person the only thing there is, the only 
actuality. Time from the inside is the time in which we think, whereas time from the outside is the time 
about which we think. The former one is actual in the sense that it represents the presence and pressure of 
the fleshly existence of events upon the mind, while the latter appears as the content of those events that 
pass upon the mental screen of memory and imagination. Hence, for any one person "no two distinct 
moments can be actual together, the actuality of one denies and excludes the actuality of any other" 
(Shackle, Op. cit., p. 15). Memory and imagination are both of them part of a person's present 
experience, they belong to the essence of the moment-in-being, they are in it and of it. The content of the 
subject-matter of their images does, indeed, bear a label with a date other than that of the moment-in-
being, but this fact no more allows us to treat these images as effective substitutes for the actuality. 
 It is worth underlining that in Shackle’s approach the distinction between the inside and the 
outside views is not the same as what the realist philosophers acknowledge as the distinction between the 
inside world of the observer based on mental representations of the world and the external or objective 
world existing independently of the observer. This is because Shackle regards both the inside and outside 
views as based on thought-experiments. There are surely other types of classification between the inside 
and the outside views which are not forcibly less interesting than the one proposed by Shackle. However, 
we do not adopt them because they are frequently established on a sharp distinction between thought-
experiments and the external, objective world. For instance, in his recent book, the realist philosopher 
J.R. Searle (1995)iv introduces two senses of distinction between “subjective” and “objective”, and 
subsequently defines the internal and the external views. For Searle, the first sense of distinction is an 
epistemic one : “Epistemically speaking, “objective” and “subjective” are primarily predicates of 
judgements” (Searle, 1995, p. 8). Those judgements which depend on certain attitudes and feelings of the 
bearers of the judgement and cannot be settled objectively are named “subjective”. In contrast, those 
judgements which are independent of anybody’s attitudes or feelings about them are “objective”. For 
example, “Rembrandt is a better artist than Rubens” is a subjective judgement, while “Rembrandt lived 
in Amsterdam during the year 1832” is an objective one. The second sense of distinction is an ontological 
one : “In the ontological sense, “objective” and “subjective” are predicates of entities and types of 
entities, and they ascribe modes of existence” (Searle, 1995, p. 8). For example, pains are subjective 
entities, since their existence depends on the feelings of the bearers of the pain. Whereas mountains are 
ontologically objective, because their existence is independent of any observer. Following these two 
senses of distinction between objective and subjective, Searle contends : “there is a distinction between 
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those features that we might call intrinsic to nature and those features that exist relative to the 
intentionality of observers, users, etc.” (Searle, 1995, p. 9). The intrinsic features of nature whose 
existence are independent of any perceiver or any mental state, are called objective or external. In 
contrast, those features of reality whose existence depend on being felt by subjects are called subjective 
or internal. For Searle, the institutions such as money, property, government and marriage, are a 
particular kind of social reality (Searle, p. 26), that exist only because we believe them to exist (Searle, p. 
32). The mental representation of an institution is partly constitutive of that institution (Searle, pp. 27-
28), since an institution can only exist if people have certain sorts of beliefs and mental attitudes. In other 
words, institutions are always created by the intrinsic mental phenomena of their users or observers, 
namely by the collective intentionality of the agents. Institutions as mental phenomena, are, like all mental 
phenomena, ontologically subjective. However this ontologically subjectivity does not prevent claims 
about observer-relative features from being epistemically objective. In fact, “all institutional facts are ... 
ontologically subjective, even though in general they are epistemically objective” (Searle, p. 63). 
 Having introduced the distinction between the two senses of “objective” and “subjective”, Searle 
elucidates his standpoint on the usual distinction between the internal and external points of view. He 
states : “in this book we are interested primarily in the internal point of view, because it is only from the 
internal point of  view of the participants that the institution can exist at all. The anthropologist from 
outside the institution may see the potlatch, for example, as performing functions of which the Kwakiutl 
participants are totally unaware, but the whole feast is a potlatch in the first place only because of the 
collective intentionality and the imposition of status-functions by the participants, and this, whether 
conscious or unconscious, can exist only from the internal first-person point of view” (Searle, p. 98). 
Here, the distinction between the internal and the external points of view derives from the distinction 
between the  ontologically subjective existence of the institutions for the participants and the 
epistemically objective existence of the institutions for the onthropologist. It is a distinction between a 
world of “thought-experiments” for the participants and a given, objective, human world which seems to 
have an existence independently of what an anthropologist might be thinking. This distinction is essential 
for a realist philosopher, since it allows him to clearly demarcate the borders of the “physical” world (or 
the world of sheer physical facts) from those of the “mental” world (or the world of institutional facts). If 
brute physical facts can exist independently of human mental representation, the institutional facts can 
only exist as the outcome of our collective intention, convention and agreement. 
 The merits of such a distinction inspired by realist philosophy notwithstandingv, it is irrelevant to 
the question that interests us. For this distinction does not account for time in the process of the formation 
and evolution of social phenomena. In Shackle’s approach, the distinction between internal and external 
is related to time and  to the relation between the action and the formation of thought in time. 
Accordingly, the difference between the historian’s or mathematician’s perspective and the producer’s 
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perspective does not amount to a distinction between the “subjective” and “objective” character of their 
respective judgements. For both perspectives share in common the fact that they are “thought 
experiments”. The difference between the internal and external points of view with regard to time lie in 
the distinction between the time in which we think, and the time about which we think.          
 Shackle’s epistemic classification of two conceivable classes of economic dynamics corresponds 
to his ontological distinction between these two views of time ( Shackle, Op. cit., p.17). It is plainly the 
outside view which gives us an economic dynamics in the accepted and orthodox sense. For in that sense 
we consider a sequence of moments to belong to one and the same actuality, and that actuality must 
therefore be that which is seen from the outside by an observer. Were he to include himself in his view of 
it, all moments except the solitary present would lose their actuality. This exterior dynamics falls further 
into three kinds : 1) deterministic or calculable dynamics; 2) inertial dynamics; 3) ceteris paribus 
dynamics. The first kind of dynamics is deterministic in the sense that the future is regarded to be nothing 
but the reproduction of what has already happened in the past. In its strict and calculable form the 
current values of all variables are made to depend on some set of their previous values, so that, if over 
some sufficient interval or series of dates the values of a self-contained set of variables are known, all 
subsequent values can be calculated. In such a deterministic dynamics, there can of course be decision in 
the empty sensevi. For Shackle, however, inspired decision is precisely an "unpredictable initiative" 
(Shackle, Op. cit., p.25).  
 Shackle calls the exterior dynamics of the second kind, inerial dynamics. This kind of dynamics 
describes the short-range guesses of people on the basis of inertia in affairs and the people’s subjectively 
bounded uncertainty. Shackle explains the role of inertia as determining the evolutionary path of 
economic changes in a way which can be compared to the concept of hysteresisvii. He contends : 
"However far a decision may depart from being an obvious reflection of obvious circumstance, its effect 
will take time to work through the economy, which meanwhile will swing along a path at first largely 
shaped by its antecedent states. It is, perhaps, only a relatively few key individuals at any time whose 
decisions can simply contribute to this course anything that can ever lie imputed to them by our outside 
observer, though we must suppose, perhaps that any man's decision can set off a chain reaction that will 
amount to a great effect" (Shackle, Op. cit., p.25). Each agent is deciding in a world of subjectively 
bounded uncertainty. For Shackle, this means that for each action open to the agent, she (he) discerns a 
great range of possible ultimate consequences, but a range which, within any finite horizon, is bounded. 
All this may give the sequence of states seen by our detached observer a sort of continuity of texture 
which will enable her to make short-range guesses about the future. The principal difference between a 
deterministic or calculable dynamics and inertial dynamics is that the former one is in a certain sense 
paradoxically timeless, while the latter one “is by its whole purpose predictive, though in a tentative and 
undogmatic way. The writer of 'inertial' dynamics invites his readers to watch for departures from the   
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inertial course of events, he continually suggests what could happen if this and if that unpredictable 
impulse should strike the system from outside its defined boundaries of internal interdependence" 
(Shackle, Op. cit., p. 27). In this use of the term if, the author of inertial dynamics is moving away from 
the role of prophet towards the task of scientific description. “To describe the orderliness of nature : this 
is all that it lies within the power of the scientist, as such, to do” (Shackle, Op. cit., p. 27).  
 Finally, in Shackle’s viewpoint the third kind of dynamics can be defined as follows. "We can in 
a certain manner combine the first two kinds into what I would call a ceteris paribus dynamics" (Shackle, 
Op. cit., p. 25). We assume that at a particular instant a number of economic agents all take decisions 
simultaneously, and that thereafter during a certain interval everything that happens is the direct or 
indirect consequence of these initial decisions. By a direct consequence Shackle means an act which 
precisely executes the initial stages of a decision. By an indirect consequence, he means an act  which is 
the automatic response merely to events which themselves derive directly from the initial decisions, or 
from the interplay of acts directly stemming from those decisions, without any new decisions in the non-
empty sense. In this manner we can simultaneously “bring fully into our analysis the inseverable 
structure of expectations and decisions and yet allow ourselves to trace consequences from antecedents 
on the supposition that no essentially new initiative interferes” (Shackle, Op. cit., p. 26). 
 Contrary to exterior dynamics, interior dynamics of the individual's solitary moment-in-being can 
be constructed only by each person for himself, since he alone can have insight into his own mind. For 
Shackle, the psychic solitary moment consists in the creation and use of expectations, i.e. the imaginative 
creation of the set of possible action-schemes and, for each action-scheme, a bounded range of its 
possible outcomes. We focus our attention on "certain expectation-elements of each such bounded range", 
and we select "one action scheme out of all those open, whose focus-elements of expectation will serve as 
the basis of anticipatory experience" (Shackle, Op. cit., p. 26). 
 There are several differences between exterior and interior dynamics. An exterior dynamics is 
public and objective : the thing studied by one outside observer can be studied by another, since it exists 
in some sense independently of the existence of any observer. It is mechanical, for it looks upon each 
momentary state of the system as a phase in the determinate behaviour of a machine of limited design, a 
machine whose whole potentialities we can in principle know, so as to be able to tell, from information 
about what has happened up to know, what will happen next. And an exterior dynamics will be 
aggregative, for it deals with the totality of the actions of many individuals to each of whom the 
observer's own relation is the same : that of aloof and detached study. And above all, exterior dynamics 
will claim to be predictive.  
II.2. The Normal : Interior Dynamics or Inertial Dynamics 
 How can the concept of the normal be reinterpreted in terms of interior and exterior dynamics? 
To which type of dynamics does it belong? Readers familiar with Marshall will know that he does not 
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articulate his thought in this way nor make any express distinction between the two viewpoints of time 
and dynamics on the lines advocated by Shackle. Nevertheless, in our view, Shackle's classification is 
extremely important to clarify the relevance of Marshallian concept of the normal. It is true that the 
Marshallian period, whether short or long, is something seen by the businessman ex ante; it is a period 
which must be estimated and planned for in advance, and we may understand Marshall most easily by 
treating all his comparisons, whether so described or not, as comparisons of alternative plans. The length 
of the period which such plans are for is, as Marshall constantly insists, a continuous variable, ranging 
from a day to several generations. But between the extremes of this range, and even between interior 
values, the differences between the relevant plans are so great as to be qualitative, and can be studied in 
the guise of types, the market period, the short period, the long period. In this respect, the Marshallian 
period can be interpreted as part and parcel of "inside" time and "interior" dynamics. Shackle has 
invented the expression “some calendar interval” (Shackle, 1965, p. 30) as a vehicle for Marshall’s 
thought. This expression allows us to distinguish clearly between two different Marshallian concepts 
which Marshall himself does not clearly distinguish, namely the futurity and the length of the supply-
interval. The framework of time ideas involved in the notion of the “calendar interval” comprises the date 
from which the producer, whose conduct we are studying, looks at this interval; the time-interval 
separating this date from the beginning of the interval (which corresponds to Marshall’s concept of the 
futurity); the length of the interval (which corresponds to Marshall’s concept of the length of the supply-
interval); and the location of all these things in the real historical context. Regarding the concept 
"normal", it represents the state which a producer (and not necessarily the observer) could look forward 
to reaching if his preparations were able to take advantage of some stated futurityviii of  the date when 
production was to begin, and of some stated minimum of total sales of the production after that date; and 
if he could ignore all possibilities both of more improvised and immediate production and sales, and of 
more carefully and lengthily distant production and sales. Take, in other words, a named calendar 
interval, specified with regard to its beginning and its end in the real historical calendar, and also its 
futurity. Let the producer concentrates all his energies on the activities within that interval. Then his 
operations in that interval will approximate to some cross section taken from that "stationary state" which 
Marshall eschews as an analytical tool. All this is on the understanding, however, that all the rest of the 
economic environment has likewise taken this interval as its sole object of preparation (Shackle, 1965, 
pp. 27-43).  
 Yet this conception of the normal must be reconciled with the fact that no producer can have 
anything like a complete knowledge or picture of possibilities that will open up as he traverses in practice 
the time-distance separating him from the named calendar interval for which he is supposed to be 
preparing. The question is whether the Marshallian concept of the normal reconciles this ex ante 
viewpoint of the businessman with the emergence of new possibilities during the calendar interval taken 
 16
to be  sufficient for the realisation of all tendencies to their full effect. According to Shackle, the 
Marshallian long-period supply curve combines both viewpoints (ex ante, that of the businessman; and ex 
post, that of the observer) into one statement and one diagram (Shackle, 1972, p. 290). Shackle writes : 
"Marshall shows us the long period from two viewpoints, that of the businessman who stands, as it were, 
upon the calendar axis and looks, by imaginative construction based on suggestions offered by the past 
and the present, along it to future dates, and that of the detached and knowledgeable observer who stands 
outside the participant's axis and can view all its distinct dates as co-valid" (Shackle, 1972, p. 289).  
 It is not evident that the the two viewpoints are renconciled in Marshall's work. There are two 
reasons for this. First, the objective of the normal as a theoretical construction is the appraisal of 
regularity in ongoing economic changes under the ceteris paribus hypothesis. The emphasis is therefore 
on the normal values as those which would be ultimately attained, at the end of calendar interval, if the 
"economic conditions under view had time to work out undisturbed their full effect" (Marshall, [1890] 
1961, p.vii). The adjective "undisturbed", referring to the ceteris paribus clause, is crucial for describing 
the normal. In this respect, in Marshall's work, the normal is similar to a ceteris paribus dynamics 
(exterior dynamics in Shackle's terminology). Second, contrary to Shackle's conception of time, Marshall 
contends : "The explanation of the past and the prediction of the future are not different operations, but 
the same worked in opposite directions, the one from effect to cause, the other from cause to effect" 
(Marshall, Appendix C, p. 773). The symmetry of prediction and explanation obtains only in an idealised 
world, where the data on which reason is to work are complete and certain for both purposes, or the data 
assumed to be non-changing or "undisturbed". In an inertial dynamics, the symmetry of prediction and 
explanation as suggested by Marshall, is justified (given that the hysteresis shows a linear character, with 
full and not selective memory). However in an interior dynamics, this symmetry makes no sense. For, as 
Shackle argues in his criticism of Marshall's induction and deduction procedures ("History, Theory and 
World Picture", Shackle, 1972, pp. 345-353), this symmetry assumes that the selection of data has 
already been performed, in a manner which is guaranteed (whence and by whom remain obscure) to be 
correct. 
 Although the Marshallian concept of the normal embraces the two viewpoints (ex ante and ex 
post), the reconciliation of the two is not achieved (Robertson, 1956; Harcourt, 1996, pp. 7-8). There 
remains a tension between two possible interpretations of the normal. It may be interpreted as the 
businessman's action-scheme as one out of all possibilities open to him, which he selects on the basis of 
what he expects might occur over the relevant time period. That is the interpretation given to this concept 
by Shackle. However it may also be interpreted as the regulatory mechanism of a changing system in 
some given calendar interval as seen by an economist or an outside observer ex post. “Regulatory 
mechanism” refers to some kind of “order” or a tendency to equilibrium in a changing economic system. 
The existence of “order” representing something constant or permanent amidst changing events is 
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independent of individual actor’s will, intention, or consciousness. However an economic order is 
dependent both on inertia in affairs and on the outcome of contending expectations. In this perspective, a 
regulatory mechanism is not just a theoretical construct the economist imposes on a system in order to 
make sense of that system, it is a real tendency or order deriving from the inertia that exists out there in 
the business world, as well as from the subjectively bounded uncertainty of actors. In this second version, 
the concept "normal" would be part of inertial (exterior) dynamics, and will claim to be predictive. In our 
opinion, Marshall's own formulation is closer to this second version, although an ex ante vision of the 
concept is not excluded either. The development of this second version of the normal, as we will try to 
show in the next section, has been accomplished by Janos Kornai. 
II. 3. Prices as Convention 
 Shackle systematically applies his inside viewpoint of time to prices. Instead of the distinction 
between market prices and normal prices, he suggests a unified conception of prices as convention in a 
dynamic world. As against the neo-classical value theory which describes the interaction of tastes and 
known circumstances (and includes in the latter everything relevant to choice), Shackle contends that 
prices depend not only on tastes with their reasonably presumed stability, and on endowments with their 
short-period constancy, but also on thoughts, the  formal contents of the mind, swiftly composing, 
combining and dissolving themselves from moment to moment (Shackle, 1972, p. 221). The causal 
relation between thoughts and prices stems from the dependence of the prices on the historical context, 
that is, on the particular point of development which technology, business organisation and the total 
social environment have reached : "... price depends on the quantity to be produced, the time available for 
producing it, and the specific historical starting point" (Shackle, 1965, p. 35). The effect of thoughts on 
the formation of prices can be captured through the expectations or what Shackle calls "epistemic 
circumstances" and their influence on economic decision (Shackle, 1972, pp. 220-229, p. 267; Shackle, 
1989, pp. 82-102). In an ex ante viewpoint of normal values, prices are the businessmen's expectations, 
judgements or evaluations of the way the production or supply as well as costs and sales will evolve 
during a calendar intervalix. 
 Without mentioning the Marshallian concept of normal price, Keynes analysed the relevance of 
expectations or businessmen’s guesses on the asset valuation in his General Theory. As a matter of fact, 
Keynes’ account of businessmens’ methods of asset valuation and ways of deciding on investment could 
be described as normal when adopting the interior perspective, in the particular environment which 
Keynes is analysing  (Keynes, 1964, Chapter 12; 1990, pp. 141-157). Reviewing Chapters 12 and 17 of 
the General Theory, Shackle considers the concept of "conventional valuation" as the "ultimate thesis" of 
Keynes (Shackle, 1972, p. 224; 1989, pp. 207-220). That ultimate thesis declared that economic actions, 
and most of all, the commanding activity of investment in durable facilities, were governed in their scale, 
character and timing, by expectations, and that expectations can be transformed, and the "confidence" 
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which gives them their ascendancy can be dissolved, by a simple suggestion from "the news", so that the 
size of the stream of general output, and the quantity of employment, rest upon the most mutable and 
elusive of all economic elements. Shackle asks : "Where, in such a vision, is any place for theory which 
assumes that conduct and policy can be rational, calculated, efficient and sure of success?" (Shackle, Op. 
cit., p. 224). In fact, for Keynes, according to Shackle, “the word conventional, applied to a market's 
valuation of assets, combines two ideas. These concern respectively the manner in which the valuation is 
arrived at, or the principle on which it is based, on one hand ; and on the other, the characteristics of a 
market judgement arrived at on the principle in question. The principle itself is that of the search by the 
market for the opinion of the majority of its own members; not, indeed, the opinion they hold at this 
moment, but the opinion they will hold tomorrow, next week or month. For when a majority holds the 
view that asset prices are about to be higher than at present, they will buy and drive up prices. The 
conventional judgements are those which, by some more or less by accidental coalescence of ideas or 
some natural but hidden means of communication, are adopted by a mass of people who cannot find, and 
are not really concerned to find, any "solid", "objective" and genuinely meaningful basis for any 
judgement” (Shackle, Op. cit., p. 225). The central idea is that all prices are influenced directly by 
expectations. Expectations work upon prices via the "liquidity premium", that is, through those 
uncertainties which account for the existence of a rate of interest (G. Shackle, 1972, p. 226). The 
measurement of a stock of diverse capital goods by valuation can have latent in it great changes in the 
basis and meaning of such valuation if the rate of interest changes, and the "revaluation or distortions of 
meaning will be unrelated to any physical or technological change" (Shackle, 1972, p. 47). 
 Neo-classical value theory declares that prices should be fluid, because it argues that at any 
moment there is a notional set of prices which would reflect rationality, and that actual prices should 
move freely in pursuit of the rational equilibrium. It is this notion of the existence of a meaningfully 
determinate equilibrium, in any setting except that of the timeless world, that a Shacklian interpretation 
of Keynes calls into question. In any other world, prices are convention. They depend upon expectations, 
which are the source of novelty. Put it differently, "in a non-momentary world prices are convention" 
(Shackle, 1972, p. 267). 
 The concept of "normal" price, viewed in its ex ante version, leads to Shackle's interpretation of 
prices as convention. But prices as convention cannot be reduced to prices as the expression of relative 
scarcity. Furthermore, in this theoretical framework, institutional changes cannot be explicated by prices, 
since prices as convention are themselves determined by an institutional matrix. This idea undermines the 
very foundation of neo-classical value theory. 
III. Kornai's Contribution to the Concept of Normal : ex post Vision 
 Janos Kornai first employed the expression "normal state” in his joint article with Weibull on "a 
queue model" (Kornai and Weibull, 1978). The concept has appeared repeatedly in Kornai's writings 
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since then, particularly in Kornai (1980, 1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1983, 1992, 1995a, 1995b). In his 
Economics of Shortage (1980), he clearly acknowledges Marshall's and Shackle's contributions in 
theorising the notion of "normal state" (Korani, 1980, p. 144). Kornai also underlines the analogy of 
economics and medicine in their endeavour to describe the normal state (Kornai, 1982, pp. 206-207), and 
reminds the reader that the term has spread in natural science and in the theory of general systems 
inspired by the natural sciences (Koehler, [1938] 1969). Despite his original inspiration by Marshall's 
and Shackle's writings, Korani formulates an interpretation of the normal state which, in our view, can be 
characterised as a systemic approach applied in social science. 
 Contrary to Shackle's conception, Kornai advocates an ex post version of the normal state as part 
of the co-ordination mechanism of economic systems. Kornai's idea of normal value also diverges from 
that of Marshall’s with regard to the relation of normal value and average value. While for Marshall, 
normal value is different from average value in a dynamic state, for Kornai the two are unconditionally 
identical by definition. The differences with Marshall's interpretation notwithstanding, we will argue that 
Kornai's conception of the normal state is a sort of development of Marshall's theory in some (but not all) 
respects. 
III. 1. Normal State, Equilibrium, and Regularities 
 As Kornai acknowledges (1980), his book Anti-Equilibrium (1971) was not sufficiently precise 
in its interpretation of the word "equilibrium". In that book, he did not distinguish between the broad and 
narrow, general and special interpretations of equilibrium. In economic theory, a narrow and special 
interpretation is attached to the concept of equilibrium according to which the market or economy is in 
equilibrium if supply meets demand. Many call this a Walrasian equilibrium (Kornai, 1980, p. 145; 
1992, p. 254). While denying this narrow interpretation of equilibrium, Kornai admits that "there exist in 
each system deeply rooted intrinsic regularities which constantly reproduce the essential properties of the 
system" (Kornai, 1980, p. 147). For Kornai, these "intrinsic regularities" constitute the normal state of a 
system and as such can be considered as a broader interpretation of equilibrium. Hence the normal state 
is a concept related to equilibrium. And equilibrium in this broad sense, is an "objective reality", a 
"tendency", which can be justified if "the relevant state variables of the system clearly shows, in fact, an 
invariance at least as a tendency and if there exist, in fact, such internal forces and regulatory 
mechanisms which drive the system back to equilibrium, if it has departed from it" (Kornai, 1983, p. 
150). In Kornai's conception, abstract economic systems have a normal state, or, regarding their 
dynamics, a normal path. The mechanism of control by norms channels the system back towards the 
normal state or the normal path, should its actual state differs from that corresponding to the norm. As a 
matter of fact, like Marshall, Kornai calls the normal state the "long-term equilibrium" of the system 
(Kornai, 1981a, p. 29). For Kornai, the Walrasian equilibrium is one narrow subset in the set of normal 
states. His interest is not restricted to this distinguished point or subset, for he also tries to capture the 
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non-Walrasian normal states. The key role of normal state can be grasped through a study of 
organisational structure. 
 According to organisation theory, every organisation consists of two abstract units : a real unit 
and a control unit. The first is the carrier of the real processes, the second that of the control processesx. 
Kornai considers norms as regulatory mechanisms and consequently proposes to classify them as control 
processes. A norm is a behavioural variable's (time-series or cross-sectional) average, but not every 
behavioural variable has an average which can be treated as a norm. We can only speak of norms if some 
control process is operating in such a way as to push actual behaviour back towards norms (Kornai, 
1981a, p. 114). By insisting on the systemic character of norms as control mechanisms, Kornai enlarges 
the sphere and the scope of application of the normality concept. Compared to Marshall interpretation of 
"normal state", Kornai does not solely speak of normal prices as opposed to market prices, but to the 
normal state or normal path of the whole economic system. In this sense, he gives a more objective, 
aggregative and predictive character to the notion of normal state. In Shackle's terminology, Kornai's 
notion of normal state may be classified as inertial dynamics. Kornai himself distinguishes wider "secular 
dynamics" from narrower, "historically limited dynamics". In the latter case, the control sphere controls 
the real sphere, while the real sphere feeds back into the control sphere merely through observations. In 
the former case, the changes in the real sphere actively modify the control sphere, the regularities 
asserting themselves in it, the response functions, types of communication and so forth (Kornai, 1981a, p. 
25). Kornai maintains that control by norms is historically limited dynamics, whereas the emergence and 
evolution of norms are secular dynamics. The norms are the result of interwoven spontaneous and 
conscious processes. There is no general pattern to determine the proportions in which these two effects 
combine. Contradictions between them are certainly possible. Everything depends on the specific system, 
and within that, on the specific control process. However, "a norm cannot continue in effect for a 
prolonged period unless it performs satisfactorily its role in reproducing the total system" (Kornai, 
1981a, p. 118, my emphasis). Norms as regulatory mechanisms assure the reproduction of the total 
system. Hence the norm can also be viewed as "feedback regulation which will always drive the actual 
value back to the neighbourhood of the normal value" (Kornai, 1981b, p. 401, my emphasis). It has been 
repeatedly emphasised by Kornai that the category of normal does not imply a value judgement of the 
researcher analysing the system, but points out an immanent property peculiar to the system (Kornai, 
1980, p. 144; 1981a, p. 115; 1981b, p. 401; 1983, p. 150; 1992, p. 254). In this context, a possible 
terminological misunderstanding must be dispelled. The expression "normative" is mostly used in the 
sense of "to be recommended", "desirable", confronting, for instance, descriptive with normative research 
: the former only establishes the facts, while the latter makes proposals. In Kornai's writings the term 
norm is not used in this latter sense. 
III. 2. Norms and Co-ordination Mechanism 
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 For Kornai, norms affecting a wide sphere of and acting over a prolonged period, as well as the 
control mechanisms for such norms, belong to the category of social  relations. They cannot be deduced 
from the technical endowments of production or from its physical input-output ratios. To explain norms 
it is essential to understand the decision-makers' ownership relations, power relations, interests, 
motivations, their conflicts and compromises (Kornai, 1981a, p. 120). An individual usually accepts the 
socially asserted norm in a more or less ready form : he inherits it from his predecessors and learns it 
from his contemporaries by emulation. By himself, he is not even capable of changing such a socially 
valid norm. As a rule, the general social conventions and traditions establish the norms. In many cases 
the norms receive legal sanction : they are prescribed by law or governmental order, and sanction is 
applied to those who do not comply with them  (Kornai, 1981a, pp. 118-119). The rules of a concrete 
economic system are expressed through the most important and widely applicable norms asserting 
themselves over long historical periods. Norms have three distinctive features : (1) habitual or routine 
behaviour; (2) stabilisation effect; (3) system specificity. 
(1) Habitual or routine behaviour : Kornai underlines the similarity between control by norms and the 
concept of habitual behaviour in economic psychology (Katona, 1963). In contrast to genuine decisions 
which are preceded by lengthy deliberation and a careful weighing of the circumstances, "habitual 
behaviour is based on custom, habitual routine, repetition, perhaps on very simple rules" (Kornai, 1981a, 
p. 121). The housewife is behaving habitually when every Saturday she buys her customary quantity of 
foods in the customary store, while it would perhaps be possible to choose another day, another store, 
other commodities, and other quantities. This point brings Kornai to stress the advantageous effect of 
control by norms : "simplification in decision preparation. The system saves thinking capacity. Were 
there no norms (or, more generally, no routinized, habitual behaviour), then society would be composed 
only of Hamlets, and become paralysed in meditation" (Kornai, 1981a, p. 121). It is noteworthy that 
Kornai grasps the crucial role of habitual behaviour, its contrast with deliberate choice, its economising 
effect in thinking procedures, and its dependence on social context before the publication of one of the 
major modern evolutionary documents, namely An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change written by 
Nelson and Winter (1982). For these evolutionary authors, the concept of routines is analytically similar 
to the genes in biological theory, or the memes or culturgens in socio-biology. As Nelson contends : "The 
term 'routine' connotes, deliberately, behaviour that is conducted without much explicit thinking about it, 
as habits or customs. On the other hand, within these (evolutionary-M.V.) models routines can be 
understood as the behaviours deemed appropriate and effective in the settings where they are invoked. 
Indeed they are the product of processes that involve profit-oriented learning and selection" (Nelson, 
1995, p. 69). In an evolutionary theoretical framework, routines are inertial forces that provide  
continuity of what survives the winnowing (Nelson, 1995, p. 56). The concept of normal as habitual 
behaviour is closer to biology rather than to mechanics. Kornai's interpretation of the normal stresses the 
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evolutionary aspect of the concept in its original version as formulated by Marshallxi. Unfortunately less 
attention is paid to this concept in recent evolutionary literaturexii. 
(2) Stabilisation effect : under definite circumstances and within a certain historical period, norms may be 
relatively stable. According to Kornai, stability follows from the definition of the concept. Not every 
behavioural variable is a norm. We speak of norms only in connection with those behavioural variables 
which for some specific time period have an easily discernible "dense" region, a centre around which they 
fluctuate (Kornai, 1981a, p. 121). In a mathematically statistical framework this usually means that the 
variable has a relatively small variance. 
 The positive effect of control by norms is that it stabilises the operation of the system. A stable 
norm helps to stabilise the real processes regulated through it. Nevertheless Korani pinpoints that the 
advantages and favourable effects of control by norms can become their opposite : "Savings in thinking 
can become thoughtlessness. Stability can turn into inertia and conservatism" (Kornai, 1981a, p. 122). 
To a large extent adaptation is guided by different control mechanisms operating on the basis of norms. 
However the norms can only function in the absence of major friction and shocks, or at least in 
circumstances which do not require fundamental changes. At the same time, attempts to maintain or 
return to the norms create difficulties for the system in adjusting to unprecedented shocks deviating from 
customary values, or to sustained and substantial changes in circumstances. "The norms and control by 
norms which serve the system in its daily adjustments can become a barrier to adaptation. In many cases 
it is precisely the norms which constitute the bonds holding the whole system in its ‘vicious circle’" 
(Kornai, 1981a, p. 123). Since the norm is not the cause of the circle, a control mechanism moving in a 
given vicious circle cannot be changed merely by changing the norm quantitatively. The quantitative 
characteristics of the norm and the control mechanism relying on this norm belong together and they 
"emerge as the effect of deeper social factors" (Kornai, 1981a, p. 124). 
(3) System specificity : as already mentioned, compared to Marshall's and Shackle's conceptions of the 
normal state, the original feature of Kornai's interpretation resides in his emphasis on the system specific 
character of norms. These norms "depend on the state which is permanently produced... by the system-
specific intrinsic regularities" (Kornai, 1980, p. 144). In fact, Marshall was not  interested in “the state 
which is permanently produced”. Not only he considered the “normal” a thought experiment, isolating 
one influence among the many which determine actual outcomes, but also he was not interested in 
perpetuating states. He wished to see major improvements in the conditions of people, and that entailed 
major changes in what would be considered normal. For Kornai, in contrast, the perpetuating states are 
particularly important since they reveal the institutional matrix of a given economic system. Kornai’s 
contention is that as long as the institutional framework is given, so are norms. Norms play an important 
role in conditioning the behavioural patterns which characterise the economic system in question, as well 
as in the constant reproduction of the important features of the system. For instance, in a socialist system, 
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shortage is not a "crisis phenomenon". Chronic shortage is the normal state of the resource-constrained 
economy. It is not only compatible with its normal operation and growth, but also one of the permanent 
features of its normal operation. Symmetrically, in a capitalist system, overproduction or unemployment 
is the normal state of the system as the demand-constrained economy (Kornai, 1980, p. 134; Vahabi, 
1993, 1995a, 1995b). Not only can essential differences between two systems often be characterised as 
differences in norms, but one could also characterise changes in a system over time in terms of changes in 
norms. For Kornai, the transition of socialist economy to market economy can be defined in terms of 
change from one normal path to another one. In his article "Eliminating the shortage economy", Kornai 
attempts to show how the fundamental changes of institutional matrix in socialist economies lead to the 
elimination of their previous normal path, namely excess demand, and the appearance of a new normal 
path, namely excess supply : "The economy switches from one normal path to the other. The attribute 
normal also conveys that these are not idealised, pure theoretical models with extreme characteristics but 
actual historical formations containing a mixture of 'good' and 'bad'" (Kornai, 1995a, p. 162). The switch 
from one normal path to another one does not need to be smooth. 
 During the transitional period, there are areas of "no-man's land", a state described at the time of 
partial reforms in Hungry by Tamas Bauer as one that was "neither plan, nor market" (Bauer, 1984). 
Kornai (1995b), in his study of "Transformational recession", characterises a transitional period as one 
which although the old property forms are shaken, mature new property forms have not arisen in their 
place. Everything is in a fluid state : "The old institutions and organisations of co-ordination cease to 
function under these conditions. But the requisite new system of co-ordination institutions... have still not 
developed" (Kornai, 1995b, pp. 179-180). Hence a transitional period is marked by the absence of any 
dominant system-specific norm. 
 The three distinctive features of norm (i.e. habitual behaviour, stabilising effect, and system-
specificity) imply a co-ordinating function. Such norms are socially defined and historically determined 
regulatory and feedback mechanisms of economic systems and consequently constitute the basis of their 
co-ordination mechanism through time. 
III. 3. Normal Value and Average Value 
 In contrast to Marshall's interpretation of normal value, Kornai defines normal value as "nothing 
else but the statistical average of the actor behaviour. Depending on the nature of the control process, an 
average either constant or regularly moving over time" (Kornai, 1981a, p. 27). For Marshall, the normal 
value is only identical with average value if the general conditions of life were stationary for a long 
enough period to enable the economic forces to work out their full effect. Nonetheless, as a general rule, 
normal value diverges from average value since the general conditions of life are not stationary, and 
because supply demonstrates increasing returns. Kornai's definition of normal value is diametrically 
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opposed to Marshall's. He considers normal values as unconditionally synonym to average values 
(Kornai, 1981a, p. 129). 
 Looking for an analogy, Kornai’s interpretation may be close to psychology. Relying upon a 
large number of observations, the normal values of the different variables of the human organism can be 
stated : the normal body temprature, the normal blood pressure, etc. These normal values are average 
values in a double sense : cross-sectionally (average of many men), and intertemporally (average of a 
long period). Some of the normal values are constant, others depend on further variables. As a rule, these 
normal values are not described by a single figure with many decimals; rather, they may be represented 
by an interval, either narrow or wide (Kornai, 1981b, p. 401). Each  normal has a regulatory mechanism. 
The control mechanism examines whether the regulatory mechanism actually is functioning within the 
system by reacting to critical values and tolerance limits which are situated at the borders of the interval. 
In fact, mathematically speaking, there exist two possible ways for translating the normal value as an 
average value over an interval. One of the possible methods of description places this category in the 
conceptual framework of probability theory. According to this approach, the system is in a normal state 
in the stochastic sense if its internal forces do not change the distribution function of the specific state 
variables, i.e. its characteristic statistical attributes, such as expected value, variance, etc. Another 
method of description expresses a similar idea but dispenses with the conceptual framework of 
probability theory. This view considers the system to be in a normal state, if the value of the variable lies 
within a certain and not too wide interval. Therefore, in this case it is not one single point that determines 
the place of the normal state variable (for a given moment in time), but a set. In such a dynamic system 
we do not have one single equilibrium path, but a great many equilibrium paths. The limits of the interval 
cannot be determined arbitrarily by the researcher. Kornai suggests both methods for defining a control 
mechanism based on the critical values and tolerance limits (Kornai, 1983, p. 148). 
 In his definition of normal value as identical to average value, Kornai dismisses the central 
message of Marshall's normal supply price : increasing returns. It should be pointed that Marshall 
contends that the part paid by man in production is generally subject to increasing returns. He also 
includes the improved organisation in his definition of the law of increasing returns. It is important to 
trace this principle of progress back to Adam Smith. He justified his claim by arguing that an expansion 
of demand usually leads to a fall in price - because the expansion causes a further division of labour, 
which in turn generates improved capabilities and new machinery. In recent evolutionary literature, 
notably the work of Brian Arthur (1988, 1989) and Paul David (1985) on self-reinforcing mechanisms in 
economics, particularly technological change and path-dependency, increasing returns have become the 
central explicatory factor for showing why institutions matter and shape the long-run path of economies. 
If one takes on board  increasing returns, then the normal values cannot be identical with average values. 
The reproduction of general conditions of a particular set of production or sales cannot be the same as the 
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average general conditions existing initially, if the reproduction involves self-reinforcing or increasing 
returns. While normal values regulate reproduction, the average values define the statistical average of 
the actor behaviour under the given general conditions. Furthermore, the unconditional identity of average 
and normal in Kornai's view is related to his neglect of the ex ante businessmen's expectations with 
regard to the normal values. In fact, in Korani's writings the ex ante view of the normality concept, which 
to some extent is present in Marshall's oeuvre, become completely secondary. This explains to a large 
extent why the average and normal values are unconditionally the same in his conception. 
         It is noteworthy that Kornai never raises the problem of increasing returns in his treatment of the 
normal state and its self-reproducing mechanism. By the same token, while acknowledging the relation of 
the normal concept to similar concepts from mathematical theory of dynamic systems, Kornai never 
underlines the non-linear character of the concept. As a matter of fact, there exist a close and neat 
relation between the increasing returns in self-reinforcing mechanisms and the non-linearity in such 
mechanisms. Taking for example "unemployment equilibrium". Kornai states : "... there is a customary, 
steady rate of unemployment under the (capitalist-M.V.) system, in which mechanisms operate to restore 
the customary unemployment if it is upset" (Kornai, 1992, p. 254, my emphasis). Elsewhere, he suggests 
a 4-5 per cent unemployment as "normal" unemployment in capitalist system (Kornai, 1981a, p. 115)xiii. 
Normal in this context can be interpreted either as Keynesian unemployment equilibrium or natural rate 
unemployment.  
 In both senses, we are not dealing with the general mathematical properties of systems with 
hysteresis, as elucidated by Krasnosel'skii and his associates (Krasnosel'skii and Pokrovskii, 1989). The 
study of such systems permits a sketch of the likely implications of non-linear hysteresis for time paths of 
equilibrium unemployment. The way employment or unemployment responds to shocks to the economic 
systems indicates some properties of non-linear hysteresis which are compatible with some recent 
mathematical findings. Although the equilibrium unemployment rate no longer returns to the status quo 
ante once a temporary shock is reversed (there can be hence no question about the "restoration" of the 
"customary" rate of unemployment), it displays remanence : "This means that the new equilibrium will 
not be the same as the old, but will remain displaced. The other major implication is that the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment retains a selective memory of past shocks : it neither forgets all past shocks, as in 
the natural rate hypothesis; nor does it,  like the elephant, remember all past shocks, as in the case of the 
linear version of hysteresis" (Cross, 1995, p. 190). From a psychological viewpoint, the same conclusion 
can be reached (Darity and Goldsmith, 1993). As Darity and Goldsmith state there is no reason for the 
economy to return to some preordained equilibrium level of employment after a shock, since the existence 
of greater unemployment will cause changes in productivity and attachment to work that create a new 
possibly sustainable, equilibrium level of employment (Darity and Goldsmith, 1996, p. 122). 
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 Despite his great contribution to the concept of normal as system specific, Kornai's identification 
of normal value with average value is a step backward compared to Marshall's conception, since it does 
not allow us to capture the non-linear character of  normality. Recent evolutionary economics literature, 
particularly that of Paul David on path-dependency provides a more convincing understanding of non-
linear character of regulatory mechanisms based on increasing returns. 
Concluding Remarks 
 Analysis must suppose something constant and permanent at the heart of things, but in 
economics this essence manifests itself in a ceaseless development. Herein lies what Marshall saw as the 
basic dilemma which faces the economist. His aim is to construct a science, a body of principles giving 
insight into economic conduct, yet "the central idea of economics, even when its Foundations are under 
discussion, must be that of living force and movement", and "the main concern of economics is thus with 
human beings who are impelled, for good or evil, to change and progress" (Marshall, [1890] 1961, 
Preface to the eight edition, p. XV). For other writers economics has meant pure logic or simple 
historiography, which does not deal with expectations, novelty and real choice. But Marshall speaks 
consistently of the businessman as being motivated by what he expects. His conception of the long-period 
supply curve is expressly designed to bring into the picture of the businessman's policy problem the 
latter's awareness that a step-by-step expansion of his scale of operations will bring into view the 
practical detail of possible economies of large scale. However Marshall tries at the same time to explain 
the permanent, un-changing and rational tendencies at the heart of changing things. As Shackle rightly 
remarks : "... Marshall's peculiar triumph is his creation of a unity out of the conceptions of equilibrium 
and of evolution" (Shackle, 1965, p. 36). From the unity of "equilibrium" and "evolution" stems the 
cardinal concept of "normal" which embraces both viewpoints of time, namely the ex post or outside 
perspective, and the ex ante or inside perspective.  
 Marshall exposes himself to a charge of confusion, since he fails to make a clear distinction 
between a curve visualised by the businessman at one moment and looking to another moment, at which 
production on this or that scale can begin, and a curve which traces the firm's actual growth path through 
an infinity of moments between two given dates. This confusion has been removed in two different ways 
by two eminent authors who followed Marshall's route in exploring the concept of normal. 
 Shackle captured the importance of ex ante viewpoint in the creation and use of expectations, and 
on the basis of Keynes definition of prices as convention in chapters 12, 17 of the General Theory. By 
introducing the notion of "epistemic conditions", he proposes to remove the contradiction between the 
"normal price" and the "market price" in order to develop a subjective, individual and dynamic theory of 
valuation on the basis of entrepreneurial judgement, guesses, and converging anticipations. Shackle also 
admits the scientific character of inertial (exterior) dynamics based on an ex post viewpoint. This kind of 
 27
dynamics, in its non-calculable version, is aggregative, objective, public, mechanical and predictive. 
However its predictive feature is not dogmatic, for it is based on conditional contentions. 
 Kornai reintroduced and developed the concept of normal in the spirit of inertial dynamics; and 
thus according to it an ex post viewpoint. The great advantage of Kornai's conception consists in his 
treatment of normal as system-specific and as a co-ordination mechanism. For Kornai, norms are part of 
"historically limited dynamics" which describe the habitual behaviours or the regulatory, feedback 
mechanisms of a system. While enlarging and enriching the field of application of normality concept, 
Kornai undermines the ex ante aspect of the concept. He attaches a mechanical (close to calculable-
version) connotation to the normal as unconditional equivalent of average value which is incompatible 
with a non-linear concept of hysteresis and the economic changes based on increasing returns. 
Notwithstanding his remarkable description of capitalist and socialist system as "underemployment" and 
"shortage" economics respectively, Kornai's insistence on an average or normal rate of unemployment in 
capitalist countries and an average or normal rate of shortage in socialist countries is questionable. 
Kornai's writings have developed evolutionary economics in its understanding of normality as habitual or 
routine behaviours. 
 The adoption of each of the two viewpoints ex ante or ex post is closely related to the position of 
agent as decision-maker or observer. In his analysis of supply curves, Marshall recognised the 
heterogenous character of economic agents, notably that of industrial and commercial capitalists. The 
merchant’s profit depends on her ability to account for both the production period of her commodities, as 
well as the market period necessary to bring them to the market. That is why the merchant has an interest 
to adopt simultaneously ex ante and ex post viewpoints. The credit system and financial capital have 
enormously developed since Marshall’s times. In our epoch, it is the complex network of large financial 
corporations which has a particular stake in following both viewpoints on the basis of a joint developed 
entreprenurial knowledge of technological, managerial and financial competences. Moreover, it is in the 
financial market that both expectation of agents and their organisational power influence to a large extent 
the direction of events. In our opinion, every effort to provide a synthesis of inside and outside viewpoints 
has to take on board : (a) the heterogenous character of economic agents with regard to their socio-
economic position as well as to their cognitive limits; and consequently their conflictual group interests, 
and the limits of their compromises; (b) the importance of complex financial and industrial networks; (c) 
the entrepreneurial competence and the organisational culture or routines embedded in the firm or in the 
networks. The principle of variety in Evolutionary Economics, and its insistence on routines, networks 
and learning can be mobilised to treat the afore-mentioned points.    
 To sum up : while Marshall's theory and intuition concerning the normal value has been 
developed by Shackle's and Kornai's contributions, the problem of combining ex ante versus ex post 
viewpoints has not yet been solved satisfactorily. By focusing on path-dependency, non-linear hysteresis, 
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and increasing returns, some recent evolutionary economics literature provide new promising solutions to 
this problem. The concept of norm and its rationalising action is particularly stressed by sociologists and 
some neo-institutionalist economists, notably Douglas North who is very close to the sociologists on this 
point (D. North, 1990). Further exploration of "normal" as a key concept in the historical analysis of 
institutional change is a challenging task for economist. In this respect, Marshall's Principles are as 
relevant as they ever were.  
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i Comments from Professor Richard Aréna, Professor Geoffrey Collin Harcourt, Professor Robert Mandeville, 
Professor Jacques Sapir and three anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are the 
author’s. 
ii We adopt here Shackle’s distinction of the two views of time (namely the outside/ex post view and the inside/ex 
ante view), and the two corresponding classes of economic dynamics, namely exterior and interior dynamics. In 
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interior perspective, the normality can be interpreted as the businessman’s expectation and action-scheme during 
a calendar interval. For a detailed discussion of the distinction, see below II-1, II-2.  
iii Marshall is however not thinking of what has since come to be known as perfect competition, not only because 
economic development requires external organisation which excludes atomistic competition, but also because 
people are generally not rational optimisers. 
iv I am particularly grateful to one of the anonymous referees who draw my attention to this recent work of 
Searle. 
v For instance, this distinction can be very useful to explain Shackle’s position with regard to prices as 
“convention” (see below, section II.3). Furthermore, Searle’s concept of “background abilities” (Searle, 1995, 
chapter 6) comes close to Kornai’s idea about “habitual or routine behaviour” (see below, section III.2), as well 
as to Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary theory of competences. It may be noted that Searle himself underlines the 
close relation between his concept of “background abilities” and that of “habitus”  (Searle, 1995, p. 132) on the 
one hand, and the evolutionary biology on the other hand (Searle, pp. 141-146).  
vi By  “decision in the empty sense”, Shackle means choice under perfect foresight (Shackle, 1989, pp. 21-22). 
Since if one feels that she knows completely and for certain all the consequences, of any practical or emotional 
concern to her, that will flow from each given act in the range of acts open to her; and if she feels that she can 
rank these various ranges of consequences according to her preference; then for her the act of choosing between 
these acts will be purely formal and automatic, her “decision” will be “empty”. For Shackle, real and not empty, 
“decision”  means the choice in face of doubt and ignorance. Yet it cannot be choice in face of chaos and 
anarchy; for one who thinks that any act can have any sequel whatever, and that there is no possibility of 
excluding anything as incapable of following from any stated course of action, would believe any one act to be 
just as wise and efficient as any other, and decision would be pointless. Consequently, decision “can only be non-
empty and non-futile, in a world of bounded uncertainty. Let me state my definition : Decision is choice in face 
of bounded uncertainty” (Shackle, 1989, p. 22).    
vii The term 'hysteresis' was first coined by James Alfred Ewing in 1881 to refer to effects which remain after the 
initial causes are removed, the context being the behaviour of electromagnetic fields in ferric metals. In the 
eighties, it became fashionable to invoke such hysteresis effects to explain why unemployment remained high 
after the temporary shocks experienced at the beginning of the eighties (R. Cross, 1995). 
viii By  “some stated futurity of the date”, we mean the time-distance separating the date from which the producer 
looks at the calendar interval and the beginning date of the interval. 
ix Shackle’s theory of “epistemic circumstances” or “conventional” character of prices in a dynamic world, can be 
reinterpreted in light of J. Searle’s theory of the construction of social reality (Searle, 1995). Since for Searle too, 
the existence of price as an institutional fact depends on our common belief that something like money exists. In 
other words, part of being money is being thought to be money. As a general rule, “for social facts, the attitude 
that we take toward the phenomenon is partly constitutive of the phenomenon” (Searle, 1995, p.33). 
x In the real sphere there exist physical stocks and physical flows. The variables of the real sphere are stocks of 
material goods and resources, production, consumption, turnover etc. The regulation of the real sphere takes 
place in the control sphere. In this sphere there are definite operators, called response functions. These describe 
the regularities in the behaviour of the participants, decision-makers of the system. The inputs of the response 
functions of the control sphere are the observations formed in the real sphere as well as the outputs of some 
other response functions. The outputs of the response functions of the control sphere constitute the decisions for 
the real sphere. These outputs interfere with real processes, and provide information for other response functions 
of the control sphere (regarding the concept of information in the Neo-classical Economics, see Vahabi, 1996). 
xi Searle’s concept of the “Background” as the “set of non-intentional or pre-intentional capacities that enable 
intentional states of function” (Searle, 1995, p.129) is relevant to the analysis of habitual behaviour (see Searle, 
1995, chapter 6). Drawing upon the work of Hume, Wittgenstein and Bourdieu’s on the “habitus”, Searle 
underlines the centrality of the Background in explaining human cognition. Furthermore, he correctly notes the 
close relation between “rule-described behaviour” and “rule-governed behaviour”. Habitual behaviours are a set 
of dispositions that make the agent sensitive to the rule structure (Searle, 1995, pp.132-146). 
xii Among evolutionary authors, G. Hodgson pays particular attention to Marshall's oeuvre as part of evolutionary 
economics' theoretical background (G. Hodgson, 1994, pp. 13-20). However, in his review of Marshall's 
Principles, he does not even mention the concept of normal and its evolutionary aspect. 
xiii Kornai’s reference to the “normal”  rate of unemployment in advanced capitalist countries is particularly 
inspired by E. Phelps’ works. However, it may be noteworthy that in his recent contributions Phelps himself 
acknowledges the pitfalls of his theory to explicate the structural slumps in Europe (E. Phelps et al., 1994). 
Presently, Phelps tries to endogenise the “natural unemployment rate” which he defines now as the current 
equilibrium steady-state rate, given the current capital stock and any other state variables. In his new theory, 
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then, “the equilibrium path of the unemployment rate is driven by a natural rate that is a variable of the system 
rather than a constant or a forcing function of time. The endogenous natural rate becomes the moving target that 
the equilibrium path constantly pursues” (E. Phelps, 1994, p.1). 
